Buch, Englisch, 264 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 395 g
Buch, Englisch, 264 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 395 g
ISBN: 978-0-333-49537-7
Verlag: Springer
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
Game theory, R.J.Aumann; bargaining, J.C.Harsanyi; Joseph Louis Francois Bertrand, M.Shubik; bilateral monopoly, J.W.Friedman; common knowledge, S.Werlang; conflict and settlement, J.Hirshleifer; cooperative equilibrium, A.Mas-Collel; cooperative games, M.Shubik; cores, W.Hildenbrand; Antoine Augustin Cournot, M.Shubik; differntial games, S.Clemhout and H.Wan, Jr; duopoly, J.W.Friedman; extensive form games, E.van Damme; fair division, V.P.Crawford; games with incomplete information, R.J.Weber; Harold hotelling, K.J.Arrow; large economies, J.Roberts; Oscar Morgenstern, M.Shubik; Nash equilibrium, D.M.Kreps; non-cooperative games, J.E.Harrington, Jr; oligopoly and game theory, H.Sonnenschein; perfect information, L.J.Mirman; prisoner's dilemma, A.Rapoport; repeated games, J.F.Mertens; shapley value, S.Hart; statistical decision theory, J.O.Berger; strategic reallocation of endowments, Z.Safra; strategy-proof allocation mechanism, M.A.Satterthwaite; supergames, J.F.Mertens; John von Neumann, G.L.Thompson; zero-sum games, M.Bacharach.