Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy

An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government
Softcover Nachdruck of the original 1. Auflage 1981
ISBN: 978-94-009-8155-3
Verlag: Springer Netherlands

Buch, Englisch, Band 3, 124 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 223 mm, Gewicht: 220 g

Reihe: Rochester Studies in Managerial Economics and Policy

Springer Book Archives

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Tollison, Robert D.

McCormick, R.E.

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Nichtregierungsorganisation (NGOs)
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Interessengruppen, Lobbyismus und Protestbewegungen

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1 Analyzing Government.- Two Approaches to Analyzing Government.- The Interest-Group Theory of Government.- Plan of the Study.- Notes.- 2 Questions to be Answered.- Wealth Transfers and Organization Costs.- The “Market” for Wealth Transfers.- What This Analysis Is Not About.- What This Analysis Is About.- Summary.- Appendix: Heterogeneity Begets Wealth Redistribution.- Notes.- 3 The Demand and Supply of Wealth Transfers.- Maximizing the Returns from Legislation in a Bicameral.- Vote Market.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 4 Legislatures as Wage Cartels.- Theory and Preliminary Implications.- A Test of Relative Wage Implications.- Wage Pay and Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 5 The Outside Earnings of Politicians.- The Market for Legislators.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Low Wage Pay as an Entry Barrier in Politics.- Summary.- Notes.- 6 The Supply of Majority Leadership.- Competition for Majority Leadership.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 7 The Determinants of Executive Branch Compensation.- Gubernatorial Compensation.- The Question of Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions.- Notes.- Name Index.