European Monetary Integration

EMS Developments and International Post-Maastricht Perspectives
3rd Auflage 1996. Softcover Nachdruck of the original 3rd Auflage 1996
ISBN: 978-3-642-79971-6
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, 384 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 170 mm x 242 mm, Gewicht: 695 g

EU monetary integration was reinforced in the 1980s when macroeconomic convergence and a dominant role of the German Bundesbank created the basis for relatively stable exchange rates and increasing EU trade volumes. The analysis here focuses on the EMS crisis of 1992/93, the topic of optimum currency areas and the problem of fiscal policies and regional stabilization in Europe, the US and Canada. This book gives an assessment of the EMS developments and shows how financial market liberalization as well as the EU single market project affect the process of economic and monetary union. The role of currency substitution and problems of the Bundesbank's monetary policy control in a changing international system are evaluated.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Welfens, Paul J. J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

European Monetary Union: Post-Maastricht Perspectives on Monetary and Real Integration in Europe.- 1. European Monetary Integration after Maastricht.- 1.1 The Ratification Crisis.- 1.2 Competitive Devaluation.- 1.3 Some Problems with the Maastricht Design of EMU.- 2. The Single Market Program and EC Monetary Integration.- 2.1 The Single Market and Monetary Union.- 2.2 Problems with the Kenen Criterion.- 3. Transition Problems towards EMU.- 3.1 Conflicts of Interest and Asymmetric Adjustment Capability.- 3.2 Institutional Aspects.- 3.3 Some German Points of View.- Discussant: Randall Henning.- The European Monetary System and European Integration: An Evaluation.- 1. Introduction.- 2. European Macroeconomic Convergence.- 3. Macroeconomic Convergence and Economic Integration.- 4. Conclusion 70.- Data.- Discussant: Vittorio Grilli.- Basic Features of a European Monetary Order.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Facing the Challenge of an EC Monetary Order.- 2.1 Lessons from the EMS.- 2.2 The Significance of Central Bank Independence.- 2.2.1 How to Achieve Independence.- 2.2.2 Instrumental Autonomy.- 2.3 Strategic Options and Organizational Aspects.- 3. The Need for Coherence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy.- 4. Perspectives.- Towards Monetary Union in the European Community: Why and How.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Where: The Meaning of Monetary Union.- 3. Why: Costs and Benefits from Monetary Union.- 3.1 Irrevocably-fixed Exchange Rates: Costs and Benefits.- 3.2 Additional Benefits from a Common Currency.- 4. How: Concrete Steps.- 4.1 Concrete Steps at the National Level: Disinflation and Convergence.- 4.2 Institutional versus Market-led Approaches to Monetary Union.- 4.3 The Institutional Approach: The Stages of the Delors Report.- 5. Summary and Conclusions.- Discussant: Alan G. Isaac.- German Monetary Unification and European Monetary Union: Theoretical Issues and Strategic Policy Problems.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Are Germany and Europe Optimum Currency Areas?.- 3. German Monetary Unification.- 3.1 Economic Structure and Monetary System in East Germany.- 3.2 Necessary Reforms.- 3.3 Benefits and Costs of Gradualism.- 3.4 Benefits and Costs of Big Leap.- 4. European Monetary Union.- 4.1 Economic Structures and Monetary Systems in Europe.- 4.2 Planned Reforms.- 4.3 Benefits and Costs of Gradualism.- 4.4 Benefits and Costs of Big Leap.- 5. Big Leap for Germany and Gradualism for Europe.- Discussant: John Williamson.- Liberalization and Regulation in the Process of Financial Market Integration in the European Community 163.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Historical Record.- 3. Liberalization and Regulation in the Commission’s New Approach.- 4. Likely Impact of the New Approach: Microeconomics.- 5. Likely Impact of the New Approach: Macroeconomics.- 6. Conclusions.- Discussant: Sydney J. Key.- Problems of European Monetary Policy Coordination in the Transition Phase.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Open Questions In Stage One.- 2.1 Does Stage One Make a Difference?.- 2.2 What Kind of Coordination?.- 2.3 How to Ensure the Stability of the EMS?.- 2.4 What Are the Merits of Currency Competition?.- 3. Open Questions of Stage 2.- 3.1 Is There a Need For an ESCB Without Responsibilities?.- 3.2 The ESCB as a Joint Subsidiary of National Central Banks?.- 3.3 Can Monetary Policy Responsibilities Be Divided in Stage Two?.- 3.3.1 ESCB Management of Interest Rate Differentials.- 3.3.2 Third Currency Interventions by the ESCB.- 3.3.3 Minimum Reserve Policy of the ESCB.- 3.3.3.1 ECU Minimum Reserve Requirements for Central Banks.- 3.3.3.2 ECU Minimum Reserve Requirements for Commercial Banks in Europe.- 3.4 An Integrated Approach.- 4. Conclusions.- Discussant: Horst Ungerer.- Creating a European Central Bank after 1992: Issues of EC Monetary Integration and Problems of Institutional Innovation.- 1. Monetary and Real Integration in the EC.- 2. The European Monetary System in Perspective.- 2.1 The EMS Record.- 2.2 German Dominance in the EMS?.- 2.3 Problems of Integrating the U.K. into the EMS.- 3. EC 1992 and Monetary Integration.- 3.1 Delors Report and Resolution of the EC Parliament.- 3.2 EMS Hardening, EC 1992 and Monetary Integration.- 3.2.1 Real Integration, Financial Markets and Monetary Integration.- 3.2.2 The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in Asset Market Equilibrium.- 3.2.3 Market Integration and Intra-EC Price Adjustment.- 3.3 EC-External Aspects of European Monetary Integration.- 4. Creating an EC Central Bank.- 4.1 Benefits and Risks from Currency Unification and EC Central Banking.- 4.2 Problems of Institutional Innovation: Policy Failure and Market Failure.- Discussant: George M. von Furstenberg.- Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a European Monetary Union: Some Public Choice Considerations.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Determinants of Inflation in a Monetary Union.- 2.1 Monetary Union and Central Bank Collusion.- 2.2 Central Bank Credibility: EMU as a Commitment Mechanism.- 2.3 EMU and the Degree of Effective Policy Competition.- 2.4 Seigniorage and the Incentive to Inflate in a EMU.- 3. The Role of Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union.- 3.1 Harmonization, International Transfers, and Fiscal Policy Coordination.- 3.2 The Role of Fiscal Restraints in a Monetary Union.- 3.3 The Effectiveness of Fiscal Restraints: Evidence from the US.- 4. Conclusions.- Discussant: Robert Solomon.- Whan Can the Fiscal System in the United States and Canada Tell Us about EMU.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Fiscal System in United States and Canada.- 3. The Relative Importance of Asymmetric Shocks.- 4. The Impact of Federal Taxes and Transfers in the United States and Canada.- 5. Redistribution and Stabilization in the EC.- 6. Conclusions 320.- Data/Appendix.- Discussant: Susan M. Collins.- The European Community as an Optimum Currency Area.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Model in a McKinnon Setting.- 2.1 Model Extension.- 2.2 Empirical Results.- 3. Conclusion.- Discussant: Karen H. Johnson.- List of Contributors.- Appendix: Demand for Money and Currency Substitution in Europe.