E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 4A, 864 Seiten
E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 4A, 864 Seiten
Reihe: Handbook of Labor EconomicsISSN
ISBN: 978-0-444-53451-4
Verlag: Elsevier Reference Monographs
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Investigates recent advances in methods and models used in labor economicsDemonstrates what these new tools and techniques can accomplish Documents how conceptual models and empirical work explain important practical issues
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Front cover;1
2;Half title page;2
3;Introduction to the series;3
4;Title page;4
5;Copyright page;5
6;Contents of Volume 4A;6
7;Contents of Volume 4B;10
8;Contributors to Volume 4A;14
9;Chapter 1. Decomposition Methods in Economics;17
9.1;1. Introduction;18
9.2;2. Identification: What Can We Estimate Using Decomposition Methods?;29
9.3;3. Oaxaca-Blinder---Decompositions of Mean Wages Differentials;52
9.4;4. Going beyond the Mean---Distributional Methods;68
9.5;5. Detailed Decompositions for General Distributional Statistics;90
9.6;6. Extensions;103
9.7;7. Conclusion;112
9.8;References;113
10;Chapter 2. Field Experiments in Labor Economics;119
10.1;1. Introduction;120
10.2;2. Human Capital;156
10.3;3. Labor Market Discrimination;165
10.4;4. Firms;193
10.5;5. Households;224
10.6;6. Concluding Remarks;229
10.7;References;229
11;Chapter 3. Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?;245
11.1;1. Why Laboratory Experiments?;247
11.2;2. Issues in Designing Laboratory Experiments;254
11.3;3. Testing ``Traditional'' Principal-Agent Theory in the Lab;262
11.4;4. Towards Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory: Fairness, Social Preferences and Effort;292
11.5;5. More Lab Labor: Bargaining, Search, Markets, and Discrimination;310
11.6;6. Conclusions;328
11.7;References;331
12;Chapter 4. The Structural Estimation of Behavioral Models: Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming Methods and Applications;347
12.1;1. Introduction;348
12.2;2. The Latent Variable Framework for Discrete Choice Problems;351
12.3;3. The Common Empirical Structure of Static and Dynamic Discrete Choice Models;352
12.4;4. Applications;387
12.5;5. Concluding Remarks---How Credible are DCDP Models?;468
12.6;References;471
13;Chapter 5. Program Evaluation and Research Designs;479
13.1;1. Introduction;480
13.2;2. Scope and Background;484
13.3;3. Research Designs Dominated by Knowledge of the Assignment Process;496
13.4;4. Research Designs Dominated by Self-Selection;532
13.5;5. Program Evaluation: Lessons and Challenges;545
13.6;References;548
14;Chapter 6. Identification of Models of the Labor Market;553
14.1;1. Introduction;554
14.2;2. Econometric Preliminaries;555
14.3;3. The Roy Model;561
14.4;4. The Generalized Roy Model;576
14.5;5. Treatment Effects;583
14.6;6. Duration Models and Search Models;607
14.7;7. Forward looking dynamic models;615
14.8;8. Conclusions;625
14.9;Technical Appendix;625
14.10;References;630
15;Chapter 7. Search in Macroeconomic Models of the Labor Market;635
15.1;1. Cyclical Fluctuations;639
15.2;2. Trends;679
15.3;3. Conclusion;707
15.4;References;710
16;Chapter 8. Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets;717
16.1;1. Introduction;718
16.2;2. Agency and Extrinsic Rewards;721
16.3;3. Extrinsic rewards and dual-purpose incentives;737
16.4;4. Behavioral approaches to agency and motivation;743
16.5;5. Dual-Purpose incentives: can pay destroy intrinsic motivation?;763
16.6;6. Conclusions;780
16.7;References;782
17;Subject Index to Volume 4A;789
18;Subject Index to Volume 4B;823
