The Science and Art of Winning Cooperative Partners
E-Book, Englisch, 128 Seiten
ISBN: 978-1-61334-467-5
Verlag: Hogrefe Publishing
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Wasserzeichen (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Scientific research shows that the most successful negotiators analyze the situation thoroughly, self-monitor wisely, are keenly aware of interpersonal processes during the negotiation – and, crucially, enter negotiations with a fair and cooperative attitude. This book is a clear and compact guide on how to succeed by means of such goal-oriented negotiation and cooperative persuasion. Readers learn models to understand and describe what takes place during negotiations, while numerous figures, charts, and checklists clearly summarize effective strategies for analyzing context, processes, competencies, and the impact of our own behavior. Real-life case examples vividly illustrate the specific measures individuals and teams can take to systematically improve their powers of persuasion and bargaining strength. The book also describes a modern approach to raising negotiation competencies as part of personnel development, making it suitable for use in training courses as well as for anyone who wants to be a more persuasive and successful negotiator.
Zielgruppe
For work and organizational psychologists, HR professionals, coaches, management trainers, and trainees
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologische Disziplinen Wirtschafts-, Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Management Verhandlungen
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Coaching, Training, Supervision
- Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologische Disziplinen Coaching, Training, Supervision
Weitere Infos & Material
[16][17]2 Models of Negotiation and Effective Communication 2.1 Normative and Descriptive Theories In the diverse field of negotiation there is no theory or general model that would cover the entire complexity of negotiation – not least because of the many different areas of application (Pruitt, 1998). Therefore, models or proposed methods generally concern relevant parts or aspects of the whole that have to be considered. Known theories can be divided into those that recommend or specify certain ways of thinking and behaving (normative or prescriptive models) and those that derive explanations and recommendations for negotiations from a description of conditions, modes of thought, and modes of behavior (descriptive models). The crux of normative theories is that no one knows whether or to what extent they are correct – even if they generally appear plausible; they are said to have content validity. With descriptive theories it is not certain whether they are still valid or how they work in general – since, although they are usually scientific, they were often tested in or derived from isolated or simplified conditions at some point in the past. Thomas (1992) lists six challenges that limit the generalizability and universal applicability of negotiation models, theories, and recommendations: 1. Models simplify the complexity of the reality or examine only certain variables. 2. The goals and perspectives considered in negotiations are very diverse. 3. Negotiations have different time-related variables and intensities. 4. Recommendations are generally not free of values but are shaped by ethical ideologies. 5. Negotiations are conducted by different people and groups. 6. Negotiations are subject to additional cultural influences. Every model allows for propositions and conclusions Ultimately, the wish of a negotiation guide is that every behavior recommendation can also be based on sound scientific research, which then makes it justifiable. Of course, this wish can be met by scientific examination. Every research tradition and every type of modeling in relation to negotiation and its conditions have their justification. After all, every model delivers a framework and plausible uses, and perhaps new insights about the negotiating domain (Zartman, 2002). However, which type of model is best for personal use and application depends on the fundamental issues, the variables included in the model, the negotiation situation, the idiosyncrasies of those involved, and the subject of the negotiation. Causal and structural models To extend the differentiation made by Morley (2006), in the following chapter six different applications and research traditions are briefly described in a clear manner. The first three examine a more normative or prescriptive approach, while the last three are more descriptive models. There are also[18]other possibilities of structuring models, which, in some cases, overlap with those described here. Causal models, for example, identify specifics of the situation, the process, and the potential result in descriptive terms. Structural models focus on steps and phases in the negotiating process in a normative sense (Carnevale, 2000). 2.2 Mathematical Microeconomic Approach: The Analytical Model Analytical models come from the rational game theory Analytical models are normative models based on game theory. In games (= negotiation, usually called bidding games), the negotiation variables that lead to an optimum result for both parties are determined (Gimpel, 2007). An analytical model assumes that the negotiation proceeds rationally and follows certain decision-making algorithms. In addition, the models assume that the negotiating parties want to maximize their benefits. Zero-sum situations In other words, in these zero-sum situations the negotiation generally concerns the distribution of something, such as a price. Because of the distribution situation, these negotiations are also called distributive – as opposed to integrative situations in which the tendency is to expand the framework within a problem solution. The overlap of the bargaining zone of the negotiatiors in a distributive situation determines whether there is a mutually beneficial solution. Bazerman and Neale (1992) coined the term zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) for the bargaining zone (see Figure 2). In the figure it is clear that there is a zone of possible agreement only if the possible target areas of the participants overlap. This is the case if the buyer’s walkaway or bottom line price is higher than that of the seller. This price is often referred to as reservation price of the buyer. ZOPA, the zone of possible agreement In the first example in the figure, the bargaining zone is relatively large, in the second example on the same scale, it is slightly smaller. If, for example, a buyer does not want to spend more than $6,000 and a seller wants at least $9,000 for the same item (example 3), there is no overlap and, according to this approach, also no bargaining zone. This can also be seen in the graphic by the fact that the buyer and seller are now at the opposite ends of the scale with their reservation prices. An interesting proposition and conclusion of this approach is that even complex negotiations can (and must) be reduced to one distribution dimension only, namely, when all the negotiation alternatives and preferences are known. Figure 2. Bargaining zone in distributive negotiation according to Bazerman and Neale (1992) [19]Nash equilibrium as a mathematical equilibrium of the alternatives An optimum solution is reached when there is no alternative outside the negotiation that is more attractive for one of the negotiating parties. This equilibrium is also known as the Nash equilibrium – after John Nash, one of the early proponents of this approach. Nash (1950) postulated four axioms to describe an optimum, cooperative result of a negotiation (bargaining). In his terms: Nash axioms: symmetry, Pareto optimum, invariant, independence 1. The benefits for both sides are symmetrical. 2. There is a Pareto optimum that is considered fair by both sides. (A Pareto optimum is coincided by “perceived fairness,” also called perceived equilibrium of the bargaining results.) 3. The result is invariant to an equal benefit, that is, it is perceived as better than other outcomes. 4. The result is independent of irrelevant alternatives. The four axioms can be explained and translated as follows: In the symmetry requirement in Axiom 1 it is clear that the mathematical model assumes an exchange situation in which “give and take” dominates and where each side wants to gain equal benefits. However, the benefit of a solution does not have to correspond to the same monetary value as long as it is only perceived as fair (Axiom 2). Axiom 3 states that there is no alternative to bargaining if the alternative does not represent a greater benefit or value for both parties. This means that the perceived value of an alternative outside of the bargaining process and the negotiated result is no better than that which is currently being negotiated. This is the actual reason for or justification of the negotiation. In the fourth postulate it is clear how important it is to analyze the situation so that negotiatiors do not have to discuss or negotiate irrelevant solutions. According to Axiom 4, these irrelevant solutions should not influence the result or the perception of the agreement. The aim is to find a solution using bargaining that fulfills all four axioms. Basically, this is mathematically possible and also independent of the negotiating parties. A solution such as this will determine the satisfaction of the participants at the end of the bargaining process (see Figure 3). Rubinstein bargaining model: optimum often in the first offer According to a newer version of this theory that extends it from single bidding situations to negotiation processes, researchers not only assume a sequence of an offer and acceptance of the offer, but several alternating offers. This model is referred to as the Rubinstein bargaining model, named after the main proponent of this direction (Rubinstein, 1982). The most important finding from research is that a result proposed in the first offer is being challenged in several alternating offers. This is precisely what makes it attractive, which ultimately leads to a situation where the result moves away from the first offer. This means that the negotiating parties sometimes accept solutions that are economically worse for them because the duration of the negotiations reduce the value of the amount to be distributed. Hence, it means that a first, well-considered offer is often a very good one. Thus, if all the preferences for the negotiating parties were known, then, according to Rubinstein, the optimum in the negotiation would already be achieved with the first offer. But in negotiations negotiatiors seldom have all the information about time-related preferences, the risk aversion, or perceptions of the individual participants available. [20] Figure 3. Possible results in distributive negotiations according to Thomas (1992). BATNA, best alternative to negotiated agreement Besides, in distributive negotiations your one’s own...
