E-Book, Englisch, 269 Seiten
Reihe: Chandos Asian Studies Series
The Next Decade for the People's Republic of China
E-Book, Englisch, 269 Seiten
Reihe: Chandos Asian Studies Series
ISBN: 978-1-78063-278-0
Verlag: Elsevier Reference Monographs
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Concentrates on the practical policy impacts and the expected outcomes each of the above areas will haveDeals with issues like the opening up of China's undeveloped western area. A subject with little coverage in other mainstream books on ChinaTakes a short to mid-term view of China's development, so that the period is highly definable and the contours of what might happen are already clear
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1 China in 2020: the leadership and the Party
Kate Westgarth1 To attempt to discuss how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese leadership might look in 2020 seems courageous, if not foolhardy. After all, Western predictions about China’s future are notable for their inaccuracy. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen protests in 1989 there was a general consensus in the first place that the regime could not survive long, and, when that proved to be inaccurate, that the cost of perceived repression would be economic growth and modernisation. Western and Western-based Chinese pundits have been foretelling China’s imminent collapse for the 20-odd ensuing years – but, so far at least, the PRC has confounded them all. So, in a departure from tradition, this chapter will not consider the future of the Party through a Western prism but through what Chinese Party members – in particular the current Chinese leadership Chinese leadership – Chinese leadership are saying about their own plans, fears, ideals and predictions for the future. It is also written on the assumption that Party rule will persist in 2020: to assume otherwise would suggest that consultation of a crystal ball is more appropriate than seeking truth from fact. Given the slow, cautious and incremental nature of reform and change in the Chinese system thus far, it also seems safe to say that moves proposed now are likely to take us well on the way to 2020 before we see their full implementation, or can judge their impact and assess their success. To put it another way, 2003 saw the first serious mention of what became Hu Jintao’s theories of Harmonious Society and the Outlook on Scientific Development. Seven years later, they are both still very much with us. The background
Despite the CCP’s reputation for opacity, the Chinese leadership has recently shown a remarkable willingness to discuss the Party’s future. Indeed, a few days after the road map for Party building and ideology for the early twenty-first century was explicitly set out by Hu Jintao in his speech to the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Party Congress in September 2009, the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD) held an unprecedented briefing for foreign journalists and diplomats. Perhaps disappointingly for the hosts – who had taken the trouble to field Professor Wang Changjiang, a top Party building expert from the Central Party School – interest from the invited foreigners reportedly focused on the non-appointment of Vice-President Xi Jinping to the Central Military Commission rather than on the nitty-gritty of Party building (Ta Kung Pao, 23 September 2009), but the message was nevertheless clear. The ‘Decision on a Number of Issues in Strengthening and Improving Partybuilding in the New Situation’ was intended to be highly significant. So what exactly went on at the Fourth Plenum? Although the full speeches made by Hu and Xi have not been published (extracts from Hu’s appeared in a Xinhua report of 18 September 2009), we know that only those two made significant speeches. Hu first read out most of the Decision and was immediately followed by Xi, who provided the customary explanation of how the decision was drafted. This was significant in two respects, firstly in underlining the importance of Xi’s position as responsible for Party internal affairs as head of the Secretariat and secondly, by extension, as secure in his position as heir apparent to the position of General Secretary of the CCP. The issues surrounding leadership succession will be considered later. For now, let’s concentrate on the contents of the ‘Decision’, the circumstances that led to its adoption and the blueprint for the Party’s immediate future that emerged from the Plenum. A learning-oriented Marxist party
In his speech, Hu Juntao was explicit that the CCP’s goal in the twenty- first century should be on the one hand the continued ‘sinicisation of Marxism’ (a concept first identified by Mao in the 1930s) and on the other ‘rendering Marxism timely and popular.’2 In an interview with the New York Times two days later, Central Party School political scientist Gao Xinmin characterised Hu’s stated aim of popularising Marxism as a ‘theoretical breakthrough’ and described the CCP’s intent to construct a ‘learning-oriented Marxist political party’. There is a tendency among many Western analysts to pass rapidly (and cynically) over any discussion of CCP Marxist theory as irrelevant or essentially retrospective and conservative, and, as Cheng Li has noted, to consider the concept of intra-Party democracy to be little more than expedient rhetoric, with little real substance.3 Yet the evident importance placed on these concepts by the leadership strongly suggests a real rather than a merely rhetorical value, which we should consider seriously. On the theoretical front, the most important new thinking to come out of the Plenum is the new political campaign, which looks set to influence the inner life of the Party at least up to 2020 – the construction of a learning-oriented Marxist party (jianshe xuexi xing zhengdang). Since the Plenum, the senior leadership has busied itself with promoting the new concept. For example, Xi Jinping spoke on the subject at a CPS conference ‘to actively encourage the building of a learning-oriented Marxist party’, recommending the study of socialist theory with Chinese characteristics and applying the core values of socialism;4 Li Changchun further expounded on it when he launched the publication of new versions of The Works of Marx and Engels and The Specialised Works of Lenin;5 the CCP General Office issued its ‘Opinions on Promoting the Building of Learning- Oriented Party Organisations’ in February 2010, combined with a circular containing detailed implementation instructions;6 and Qiushi on 16 March 2010 commented on ‘A Major and Urgent Strategic Task – On Efforts to Build a Learning-oriented Marxist party’. The last document provides some insight into the problems the campaign is intended to address, commenting that, while overall the Party is up to the task of governance, there remain some serious unresolved issues: Some leading groups don’t make enough effort to promote Scientific Development, or don’t have the ability to deal with complex issues, and some grassroots organisations are weak and lazy. Some cadres do not have firm ideals and beliefs; some are content with the status quo, lead a vain and unchallenging life and lack a pioneering and creative attitude; some have a weak sense of purpose, show strong signs of individualism, and display formalism and bureaucracy; a small number abuse power for personal gain and are corrupt. Part of the solution to these problems is a return to the classroom, although the author is well aware that there may be some resistance: Some cadres lack a sense of urgency and a sense of responsibility. Some rely on old skills, and don’t care that they don’t have enough ability to cope with rapidly developing and increasingly difficult tasks; some set work against learning, separate learning from work, and regard learning as an imposition; some are flighty, impetuous and restless, cannot concentrate on study, and are not interested in it; some focus on paperwork in office hours and parties after work, then claim they have no time to study. But a return to the Marxist classics, Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, the Three Represents and (particularly) Scientific Development theory is only a partial answer. Textbook learning, and analysis of how Marxist theory can be adapted to fit contemporary circumstances are essential, but the campaign has another facet. Li Changchun made it clear that enthusing the public about contemporary Chinese Marxism is also part of the deal: We must stick to being grounded in the masses, satisfy the demands of the public, respond to the concerns of the public, and solve the problems that vex the public, speak clearly about profound theory using plain and real language, explain deep truths in ways that the masses are willing to accept and do a better job of getting scientific theory to the people and into their hearts. The points about clear speech, plain and real language and accessible presentation have been the focus of another speech by Xi Jinping, again to the Central Party School, extracts from which were published in the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) on 14 May 2010. Once again, cadres were directed both to look back to the classics – ancient Chinese literature in this case – in order to make their communications simple and concise, and to learn ‘colloquial wisdom’ from the public in order to make their speeches and articles more accessible. If current rhetorical styles continued to proliferate, they were warned, the Party’s authority would be undermined and its officials would be increasingly isolated from the public. Xi also suggested some reasons for the failings of cadres in this area: Some lacked knowledge, experience and skill, and were unable to say anything useful or new. Some were lazy, failed to undertake independent research and...
