An Empirical Analysis
E-Book, Englisch, 225 Seiten
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7123-1
Verlag: Elsevier Reference Monographs
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Front Cover;1
2;The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;Preface;8
6;Chapter 1. Introduction;14
6.1;I. INTEREST AND NATURE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER;14
6.2;II. PREVIOUS WORK;19
7;Chapter 2. Theoretical and Institutional Aspects of Tariff Policy;24
7.1;I. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING BY POLITICIANS;24
7.2;II. THE ROLE OF PRESSURE GROUPS;29
7.3;III. RESPONSE TO PRESSURE;33
7.4;IV. REMAINING PRESSURE POINTS;40
7.5;V. CONCLUSION;44
7.6;APPENDIX: THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM;45
8;Chapter 3. Equilibrium, Continuity, and Change in the Tariff Structure;48
8.1;I. INTRODUCTION;48
8.2;II. THE EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH;49
8.3;III. PROBLEMS WITH THE EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH;53
8.4;IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH;59
9;Chapter 4. Measures of Protection;62
9.1;I. NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE TARIFFS;62
9.2;II. POSSIBLE USE OF INPUT DUTIES AS A REGRESSOR;65
9.3;III. NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE TARIFFS: A COROLLARY;67
9.4;IV. NONTARIFF BARRIERS;68
9.5;V. SUMMARY;74
9.6;DATA APPENDIX: SOURCES AND DETAILS OF TARIFF AND NTB DATA;75
10;Chapter 5. The Comparative Disadvantage Variables;80
10.1;I. INTRODUCTION;80
10.2;II. HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TARIFFS AND COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE;81
10.3;III. PREVIOUS WORK;87
10.4;IV. MEASUREMENT;96
10.5;V. SUMMARY;100
10.6;APPENDIX: TARIFFS, RENTS, AND QUASI-RENTS;101
11;Chapter 6. Other Hypotheses and Variables;104
11.1;I. TARIFFS AND PRESSURE GROUPS;104
11.2;II. DISPLACEMENT COSTS;120
11.3;III. TARIFFS AS A PRODUCT OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION;130
11.4;IV. TARIFF STRUCTURE AS A REMNANT FROM THE PAST;142
11.5;V. TARIFFS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST;145
11.6;VI. SUMMARY OF VARIABLES;148
11.7;DATA APPENDIX: SOURCES AND DETAILS OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES;152
12;Chapter 7. Empirical Results;160
12.1;I. INTRODUCTION;160
12.2;II. THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE MODEL;163
12.3;III. INTEREST GROUPS;165
12.4;IV. DISPLACEMENT COSTS;169
12.5;V. COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE;173
12.6;VI. HISTORICAL CONTINUITY;177
12.7;VII. BARGAINING;179
12.8;VIII. MISCELLANY;181
12.9;APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTS PERFORMED;185
13;Chapter 8. Conclusion;196
14;References;202
15;Index;218
