Revealing Their Motivation, Theology and End Time Predictions
E-Book, Englisch, 198 Seiten
ISBN: 978-0-9967245-4-8
Verlag: Isaac Publishing
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CHAPTER ONE Origins and history of the Islamic State (IS) Islamic State’s history demonstrates that it has the resilience that all successful terrorist/insurgency groups have to have. Successful groups are able to recover from setbacks and regain their strength. Part of the reason for this is that they see themselves as fighting a long war and they aim to outlast their opponents. The ideology which has motivated support for the group still remains relevant and attractive. Islamic State has already demonstrated that it can recover from defeats and from huge loses of personel, including experienced leaders. This suggests a pessimistic prospect; Islamic State is likely to remain a persistent threat, even if it suffers overwhelming defeats. In its magazine Dabiq, Islamic State quoted from Islamic sources to emphasize the importance of outlasting its enemies: “Zayd Ibn Aslam said, ‘Be patient upon jihad, outlast your enemy in patience, and perform ribat [defined by IS as “defending the frontier post”] against your enemy’” [Tasfir at-Tabari].12 Islamic State has shown a degree of flexibility, particularly in the alliances it forms with those who can help it and the changes it has made to organizational structure. However, its ideology has not changed significantly in the years it has been active. The group’s tactical flexibility has allowed it to be fluid and to seize on the opportunities which have presented themselves in an ever changing and very volatile environment. The development of the Islamic State can be divided into five eras:13 1. Emergence, 2002-2004 - the group first emerged in 2002 as jamaat al-tawhid wal-jihad14 under the leadership of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Salafi/Jihadi who had fought in Afghanistan before moving to Iraq in 2001. Al-Zarqawi was more influenced by takfiri ideology than the AI-Qaeda leadership, and was responsible for the group’s extreme anti-Shiism and its focus on restoring the caliphate. The group sought to exploit the conditions created by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq which eliminated the state-bearing structures of the Baath Party and the Iraqi Army, creating a vacuum that enabled the emergence of violent Islamist insurgencies, both Sunni and Shia.15 2. Merger with AI-Qaeda in Iraq, 2004-2006 - in 2004 al-Zarqawi swore allegiance to Osama Bin-Laden, uniting al-tawhid wal-jihad with the Al-Qaeda Iraqi franchise as AI-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under his leadership. AQI engaged in brutal provocative attacks on Shia citizens, mosques and shrines in the hope of igniting a civil war.16 3. Period of weakness, 2006-2010 - The brutality of AQI, even against Sunnis, triggered co-operation between Sunni tribal leaders17 and the American military surge. In June 2006 al-Zarqawi was killed by a US air strike, initiating a period of decline for AQI. In January 2006, AQI had joined other Sunni insurgent groups to form the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC), which in October 2006 proclaimed itself as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), with AQI as its leading organization under a new leader, the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri and an overall leader, the Iraqi Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi.18 Between 2007 and 2010, ISI lost most of its manpower in attacks by the combined Iraqi, US and Sunni Awakening forces. Several of its leaders were killed,19 including Al-Masri and Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the new leader.20 During this time a number of imprisoned ISI leaders came into contact with former high ranking Baathist military officers and officials in US-run prison camps.21 The result was a powerful fusion of Salafi/Jihadi ideology with professional military and counterintelligence strategies and urban warfare tactics, as well as bureaucratic know how needed to run a state.22 4. Resurgence, 2010-2014 - the secret of the group’s resurgence lies in its alliance with the former Baathist officers and officials who contributed their skills.23 Salafi/Jihadis and radicalized Baathists united under its ideological banner to form an effective leadership core.24 In 2009 Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki initiated increasingly sectarian policies which marginalized Iraq’s Sunnis.25 Exploiting Sunni resentment and the deepening Sunni-Shia rift, al-Baghdadi developed a powerful support base among alienated Sunnis, blending his group into local communities and giving it a leading role in Sunni resistance. At the same time, the Baath officers turned ISI into a professional fighting force.26 ISI continued to conduct high-profile attacks while expanding its territorial base.27 It used untrained foreign volunteers as suicide bombers utilizing both suicide vests and vehicles packed with explosives.28 The Syrian civil war that began in March 2011 created an opportunity for ISI intervention. Al-Baghdadi sent a small number of fighters to Syria to build an organization and establish secure bases. In January 2012 this Syrian branch was officially founded as the Al-Nusra Front, which soon established itself as the main rebel group in Idlib, Deir al-Zor and Aleppo.29 In March 2013 ISI overran the provincial city of Raqqa on the Euphrates and made it its capital. ISI appointed a new city council and organized a variety of civil organizations to supply needed services. Hundreds of known opponents were brutally eliminated, creating fear and subservience.30 In April 2013, fearing Al-Nusra was getting too independent, al-Baghdadi announced the merger of ISI with Al-Nusra Front under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).31 However, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, leader of Al-Nusra, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of AI-Qaeda, rejected the merger. After an eight-month power struggle, AI-Qaeda cut all ties with ISIS on 3 February 2014, while Al-Nusra publicly pledged allegiance to AI-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.32 This created a rift between the two largest and most efficient Salafi/Jihadi organizations, as ISIS fought Al-Nusra and other rebel groups to establish itself in Syria. Although initially pushed out of several regions of northern Syria in 2014, an influx of ISIS fighters from Iraq helped it defend Raqqa and reconquer several lost territories.33 In Iraq in January 2014 it took over Fallujah, 40 miles west of Baghdad.34 5. As the Islamic State (IS), 2014 onwards - In June 2014, ISIS conducted a lightning drive through northern and western Iraq, seizing Mosul and Tikrit as well as large areas of Ninewah, Salah al-Din and Ta’mim provinces. It captured several strategic border crossings with Syria as well as some hydroelectric dams and oil refineries. It also gained large quantities of sophisticated weapons.35 ISIS forces then began a move towards Baghdad while also threatening the autonomous Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria.36 ISIS now controlled a contiguous territory that included a third of Iraq and a quarter of Syria, with a population of some eight million people.37 Following these victories, on the 28th June 2014, the Shura Council of ISIS declared the establishment of the caliphate, renaming itself as Islamic State (IS), with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph to whom all Muslims owe allegiance.38 A proclamation, “This is the Promise”, was issued detailing the ideology and goals of the caliphate and calling on all Muslims in the world to support the new caliph.39 Inspired by the IS military success and its declaration of the caliphate, thousands of foreign Muslims flocked to Syria and Iraq to join its forces.40 In August 2014, IS initiated a push towards the Kurdish regions along the Iraq/Syria border, capturing Sinjar, the center of the minority Yazidi community. It was the brutal treatment of the Yazidi population in Sin-jar,41 which faced the threat of genocide, that finally moved the US and western governments to launch a relief operation to Mount Sinjar and initiate air assaults on IS forces in Iraq.42 As a result, IS has suffered some setbacks, as at Kobane on the Syrian-Turkish frontier, where Kurdish forces supported by US airstrikes managed to roll back the IS siege of the town by late January 2015.43 Iraqi government forces, strengthened by Shia militias and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, have retaken some territories such as Sinjar and Tikrit, easing IS pressure on Baghdad.44 However, IS is proving to be very resilient and has simultaneously opened six new fronts in Iraq’s Anbar Province in the first months of 2015.45 Its forces also appeared in and around Damascus and the Syrian southwest in April 2015. It would seem that it is still able to secretly prepare for opening new fronts before appearing suddenly in full force.46 Underlying factors in IS’s development While Islamic State identity is shaped by its ideology (which will be discussed in the next section), its rise to power was largely facilitated by geopolitical...
