E-Book, Englisch, Band 64, 126 Seiten
Reihe: Münchener Reihe
E-Book, Englisch, Band 64, 126 Seiten
Reihe: Münchener Reihe
ISBN: 978-3-86298-079-6
Verlag: VVW GmbH
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Der Beitrag „Impact of Health Savings Accounts on Precautionary Savings, Demand for Health Insurance and Prevention Effort“ untersucht den Einfluss von steuerlich begünstigten Gesundheitssparkonten auf das Sparverhalten, die Nachfrage nach Krankenversicherung und Prävention.
Im zweiten Beitrag „Yes, No, Perhaps – Explaining the Demand for Risk Classification Insurance with Imperfect Private Information“ wird untersucht, welche Granularität der Risikoklassifizierung optimal ist, wenn die Versicherungsnehmer unvollständige private Information über ihren zukünftigen Risikotyp haben.
Der dritte Beitrag „The Demand for Enhanced Annuities“ analysiert die Reaktion des Marktes auf die Einführung von sogenannten Enhanced Annuities. Dabei handelt es sich um Rentenversicherungsprodukte, die die individuelle Lebenserwartung bei der Tarifierung berücksichtigen.
Die wissenschaftliche Arbeit ist auch für Mitarbeiter in Versicherungsunternehmen von Interesse, da sie wichtige Bereiche des Produktmanagements in der Lebens- und Krankenversicherung behandelt.
Petra Steinorth’s dissertation consists of three theoretical models, which all examine the economics of selected multi-period insurance decisions with private information on the part of the insured. The thesis makes an important contribution to insurance economics literature as multi-period problems have not yet been widely studied.
The article “Impact of Health Savings Accounts on Precautionary Savings, Demand for Health Insurance and Prevention Effort” investigates how tax incentives like health savings accounts influence savings for medical costs, the demand for health insurance and ex ante moral hazard.
The second article “Yes, no, perhaps – Explaining the Demand for Risk Classification Insurance” examines the optimal risk classification in case the insured have incomplete private information regarding their future risk type.
The third article “The Demand for Enhanced Annuities” analyzes the market reaction to the introduction of
so-called enhanced annuities, which are annuities that take individual factors influencing life expectancy into account for pricing.
The scientific dissertation is also of interest to insurance practitioners as it examines important issues in the field of health and life insurance product management.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Vorwort des Herausgebers;8
2;Vorwort der Verfasserin;10
3;Contents;12
4;List of Figures;16
5;List of Variables;18
6;Chapter 1: Introduction;20
7;Chapter 2: Impact of Health Savings Accounts on Precautionary Savings, Demand for Health Insurance and Prevention Effort;26
8;Chapter 3: Yes, No, Perhaps? - Explaining the Demand for Risk Classification Insurance with Fuzzy Private Information;54
9;Chapter 4: The Demand for Enhanced Annuities;94
10;Chapter 5: Conclusion;132
11;Chapter 6: Literature;134
Chapter 5 Conclusion (S. 113-114)
This cumulative thesis consists of three theoretical papers on selected insurance decisions for multiple periods where customers have private knowledge of relevant characteristics for pricing. In all scenarios, the insured have the choice between di?erent insurance and/or saving vehicles among which one is designed to address the above-mentioned issue of private information.
The aim of all three papers is to investigate individual optimal insurance decisions and, thus, assess the demand reaction to those products aiming to reduce private information issues. The ?rst paper demonstrates that, without imposing a minimum deductible, tax-favored HSAs lead to a voluntary reduction in insurance coverage. However, if a too high minimum deductible is imposed, it can be better to remain in traditional health insurance.
The paper also shows that the aim of HSAs to increase savings and e?ort simultaneously cannot be reached. The second paper investigates insurance contracts in the case of hidden information from the reverse perspective. In this paper, we assume that risk classi?cation is executed up to a degree such that individuals want to insure against it. Allowing for fuzzy private information that is heterogeneous among agents we explain the existence of risk classi?cation insurance in certain markets. In addition, we show that Pareto improvements are possible compared with the standard risk classifying insurance contracts by the additional o?er of risk classi?cation insurance.
The third paper examines the demand for enhanced annuities and shows that if there is private information, enhanced annuities will be in demand. With complete private information, all individuals purchase enhanced annuities while varying precise knowledge among the insured can lead to situations where only part of the population buys enhanced annuities. However, the paper indicates that welfare is reduced by the introduction of enhanced annuities compared with a situation with only standard annuities available.
To sum up, the design of insurance contracts plays an important role when information on insurance markets is distributed unequally between insurers and insured. In many cases, expediently designed contracts can lead to increased utility and welfare. However, this thesis illustrates that careful economic consideration of demand reactions is necessary. Rational behavior due to multiple incentives can sometimes lead to di?erent outcomes from those expected at ?rst sight, as demonstrated by the selected papers of this thesis.
